It is also allowing foreign-built, foreign-flagged and foreign-crewed vessels to carry cargo between American ports.

That contradiction could continue beyond this summer.

The White House is considering another extension of its Jones Act waiver as renewed conflict with Iran creates concerns about fuel prices and supply disruptions. The current waiver, first issued in March and later extended for 90 days, is scheduled to expire Aug. 16. Administration officials are reportedly considering geographic limits as part of another extension.

The Jones Act generally requires cargo moving between two U.S. ports to travel aboard vessels built in the United States, owned by Americans and operated with American crews.

The waiver temporarily opens that domestic trade to foreign vessels. It has allowed foreign ships to move oil, fuel, fertilizer and other commodities between American ports during the disruption caused by the Iran conflict.

The White House argues that the waiver increased shipping capacity, moved supplies faster and helped prevent shortages.

That may be true.

But the administration has not publicly demonstrated how much the waiver has reduced prices, where the benefits have occurred or whether those benefits outweigh the consequences for American shipowners, shipyards and mariners.

That matters in Hampton Roads.

The region is home to one of the country’s most concentrated maritime economies, including naval shipbuilding, ship repair, commercial port activity, maritime logistics and thousands of businesses that support the movement and maintenance of vessels. The Virginia Maritime Association says its roughly 400 member companies employ more than 70,000 Virginians.

If Washington can suspend protections for the domestic maritime market whenever prices rise or capacity becomes constrained, companies considering major investments in American vessels and shipyards have reason to question whether the market will remain protected long enough to justify those investments.

The waiver is difficult to reconcile with the administration’s own maritime strategy.

In February, the White House released America’s Maritime Action Plan, describing increased domestic shipbuilding capacity as the “cornerstone” of its effort to restore American maritime strength. The plan acknowledges that less than 1 percent of new commercial ships are built in the United States and says the country lacks the capacity needed to meet national priorities.

The plan calls for reliable, long-term demand for American-built ships, investment in shipyards, expanded workforce development and reduced dependence on foreign suppliers.

The waiver does the opposite, at least temporarily. It directs domestic cargo toward vessels that were built abroad and operate outside the American maritime system.

Emergencies sometimes require compromises. The United States cannot manufacture additional tankers overnight, and policymakers facing fuel shortages cannot wait years for new ships to be constructed.

But that explanation raises a more uncomfortable question.

If the United States does not have enough domestic vessels to respond to a foreseeable global energy disruption, is the Jones Act the problem, or has the country failed to build the industrial capacity that the law was supposed to protect?

The answer may be both.

Supporters of the Jones Act argue that the waiver has rewarded foreign shipping companies without providing meaningful relief to American consumers.

More than 120 maritime executives and industry leaders signed a May letter urging Congress to oppose an extension. The Shipbuilders Council of America said the waiver had not lowered gasoline prices and argued that global crude-oil supply, not the cost of moving products between domestic ports, remained the primary driver of fuel prices.

An industry analysis published by the law firm Adams & Reese claimed that 95 percent of completed waiver voyages benefited foreign maritime companies and that 29 percent involved vessels with some connection to China, including ownership, joint ventures or construction in Chinese shipyards. Those figures were presented by waiver opponents using Maritime Administration data and should be independently scrutinized before being accepted as a complete assessment of the program.

The White House has said the waiver allowed more supplies to reach U.S. ports more quickly. But increased shipping capacity does not necessarily mean substantial savings at the pump.

An analysis cited by The Associated Press estimated that the waiver could reduce East Coast gasoline prices by about three cents per gallon while potentially raising costs on the Gulf Coast. Oil prices, refinery capacity, global production and the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remain much larger forces.

That does not mean three cents is irrelevant. It does mean the administration should be transparent about what American maritime capacity is being traded away and what consumers are receiving in return.

Defending the Jones Act should not require pretending that the American maritime system is healthy.

American-built vessels generally cost considerably more than vessels constructed overseas. Domestic operators face higher labor, regulatory and capital costs. Critics argue that the law limits competition, discourages maritime commerce and raises costs for places such as Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico that cannot easily substitute trucks or rail for ships.

A protected market that produces too few ships at unaffordable prices is not a complete industrial strategy.

Neither is repeatedly suspending the market when its capacity is needed most.

Washington cannot claim that commercial shipbuilding is essential to national security while treating foreign vessels as the default solution whenever an emergency exposes domestic shortages.

The country must decide what it actually wants.

If the Jones Act is central to national defense, the federal government should create enough predictable demand, financing and construction capacity to make the domestic fleet viable.

If the law is primarily protecting an expensive and undersized market, policymakers should confront that directly rather than maintaining it during normal periods and suspending it during crises.

Virginia’s congressional delegation, maritime employers and regional leaders should press the administration for specific information before another extension is approved.

How many waiver voyages have originated from or arrived at Virginia ports?

Which companies have benefited?

How much cargo has been moved?

How much money have consumers saved?

Have American vessels been displaced?

Are foreign vessels operating under the same security, labor and safety expectations imposed on U.S. operators?

And what is the plan to ensure that the next geopolitical emergency does not produce the same shortage of American maritime capacity?

The Jones Act debate is often reduced to a choice between patriotism and lower prices.

The real issue is harder.

America has allowed its commercial shipbuilding capacity to erode for decades. It is now attempting to rebuild that capacity while depending on foreign ships to manage a domestic supply emergency.

That is not simply a shipping-policy dispute.

It is a warning about the condition of the American industrial base.

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The Ledger Star is an independent digital publication covering the people, decisions, investments, and ideas shaping the future of Hampton Roads. It focuses on what matters most to the region's business, civic, and community leaders, providing context and analysis rather than chasing every headline.